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Are Markets in Personal Information Morally Permissible? 
 





In this paper, I shall discuss what I call the Argument From 
Exploitation. This argument has as its conclusion that for-profit markets 
in personal information are morally impermissible. The main premise 
given for this conclusion is that markets in personal information involve 
exploitation of vulnerable people, and appertaining inequalities. I try to 
show that at least one of the premises of this argument is false. I then 
entertain an objection to my argument that holds that adding the option 
for vulnerable people to sell their personal information is in itself 
harmful, even if these people would be better off if they took the option. 
I try to demonstrate why that objection is not successful. In the end, I 
conclude that the Argument From Exploitation is not sound, and that 
until proven otherwise, we should thus think that markets in personal 
information are morally permissible. 
Introduction 
Since ”information”, ”market” and ”personal” can all denote many different things, so can a ”market in 
personal information”. When I use the latter term in this paper, I shall mean the following: A for- profit market 
in personal information, where people can sell information about their sex, age, job, medical history, consumer 
habits, online browsing history etc. Markets in information can be barter markets, or it can be monetary 
marketsi. Such information markets are already in place. When we create a ”free” account on a social media 
platform, the service we receive is often in exchange for the data we produce while we use the service, and 
sometimes also the data created on the device we are accessing the social media platform from. In that sense, 
the service is not free at all. In the social media market, the seller of information does usually not receive 
monetary goods in exchange for the information. Instead, she gets access to the service provided by the social 
media company. So, in information markets, information is not always exchanged for money. The personal 
information bought on these markets are often used for advertisement purposes. Online targeted advertisement 
based on personal information is one of the most lucrative markets in the world (Rössler 2015: 141). This fact 
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makes the discussion about the permissibility of these markets very important and pressing. Even though 
people’s lives are rarely at stake when information is bought and sold, as opposed to, say, organs, the size of 
the information market makes it worth discussing.  
In this paper, I will discuss arguments related to markets where personal information is both 
traded for money directly, and markets where it is not. There has been a lengthy debate in the philosophical 
literature about whether there should be limits to what money can buyii. These limits can be moral or legal. A 
moral limit means that it is morally impermissible to sell or buy certain things. A legal limit means that it is 
illegal to sell or buy certain things. For example, most people probably think that it is morally permissible to 
have sex with other consenting adults, but some people think that it is not morally permissible to have sex with 
a consenting adult for money. In some countries, the latter is even illegal. Likewise, it is often said that it is 
morally permissible to donate your kidney, but some people think that it is morally impermissible to sell your 
kidney. In most countries, the latter is illegal.  
Occasionally a new article about the moral or legal permissibility of markets in personal 
information is published – some in academic journals (Lauden 1993; Jerome 2013), others in the popular press 
(Buytendijk & Heiser 2013). Some of them argue that markets in personal information are morally wrong, and 
others argue that these markets are perfectly permissible or should even be encouraged. But, little attention has 
been paid to the markets in personal information in the philosophical literature on the limits of markets (See 
Rössler 2015 for an exception). In this paper, I will try to do just that by reconstructing an argument in favor 
of the view that for- profit markets in personal formation is morally impermissible, due to their exploitative 
nature. I will then try to demonstrate why that argument is not sound, and thus why at least that specific 
argument should not convince us that for- profit markets in personal information are morally impermissible.  
 
Markets in Personal Information 
In this section, I will briefly explain what a market in personal information is and how it works. Simply put, 
markets in personal information can, like all markets, be separated into two categories. The first category is 
barter markets, the second is monetary markets. In a barter market, goods or services are exchanged for goods 
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or services. In a monetary market, goods or services are exchanged for money or a similar means of exchange 
(Binswanger 2013). When social media platforms offer their services in exchange for the user’s data, it is an 
instance of barter. When so-called PIMS (Personal Information Management Services) help individuals 
manage and sell their personal information to others, it is an instance of monetary markets. PIMS can work in 
many different ways, but a common way is the following: The data owner, call him Owen, pays the company 
running the PIM a fee to help him control and manage his online personal data. Data brokers can then buy 
Owen’s data through the PIM. Owen has full control over to whom the data is sold, and Owen gets a cut every 
time his data is sold (See European Data Protection Supervisor)iii.  
A common market in personal information that is both a barter market and a monetary market, 
is the market in information produced through so-called Internet of Things (IoT). In this market, people 
produce personal electronic information through their internet-connected devices, such as robot vacuum 
cleaners, electricity meters, self-diving cars etc. In IoT markets, the data produced through these devices are 
usually not traded directly for money between the ”producer” of the data, and the producer of the device. 
Instead, the producer of the data gets an ever-improving device, since the producer of the device will use all 
the data produced by all its customers, to create updates to the devices. Some Artificial Intelligence based 
devices can even learn from past mistakes in real-time (Holstein et al. 2018). This means that the robot vacuum 
cleaner will be more efficient, the self-driving car will make fewer mistakes etc. However, some IoT companies 
also offer platforms, where the producer of the information can sell the information directly to others, and get 
a cut of the prize (See blog.iota.org). So, specific IoT markets are sometimes set up as both a barter market 
and a monetary market, and the costumer can choose which way she wants to ”sell” her information.  
There are numerous other examples of markets in information, but I think these examples will suffice for the 
purpose of this paper. The arguments and objections discussed in this paper are related to both barter markets 
and monetary markets, although the objections often involve money. Thus, the arguments and objections are 
not sensitive to the means of exchange in question, and neither are they sensitive to the specific way in which 
the information came about. In the next section, I will present an argument which has as its conclusion that 
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for- profit markets in personal information are morally impermissible. I shall call it the ”Argument From 
Exploitation”.  
The Argument From Exploitation 
In this section, I reconstruct an argument based on a worry that seems to be very common in both the academic 
literature and in the popular pressiv. I reconstruct it because no one has put it on argumentative form explicitly, 
as far as I know. The worry is that poor people will be willing to give away or sell their personal information 
cheaplyv, and that rich people will exploit this fact by offering poor people very bad deals when they buy 
personal information from the poor. This exploitation is presumably problematic in itself, but it also tends to 
lead to problematic inequalities in society. Or so the worry goes. Besides the exploitation in itself and the 
appertaining inequality, one of the things that seems to trigger this worry is that we are talking about personal 
information. The more personal information you sell, the less privacy you have. Moreover, the less privacy 
you have, the harder it will be to live a flourishing and autonomous life (van der Sloot 2014; Moore 2010: 33). 
If we had been talking about non-personal information, or other goods or services, which are not manifestly 
important for people’s lives to go well, the worry would not be as evident as it is.  
One academic proponent of the worry that markets in personal information will lead to 
increased inequality, is Joseph Jerome in his article ”Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data’s Different Burdens 
and Benefits” (Jerome 2013) (See also Thouvenin, Weber, & Frueh, 2017: 7; Grassegger, 2018 for examples 
where data buyers and collectors presumably externalize costs on poor people, while internalizing benefits). 
In this article, Jerome summarizes the worry in the following way: “While the benefits of the data economy 
will accrue across society, the wealthy, better educated are in a better position to become the type of 
sophisticated consumer that can take advantage of big data.” (Ibid: 50) 
The philosopher Beate Rössler seems to share this worry. In her article ”Should Personal Data be a Tradable 
Good?” she follows Debra Satz’ general worry about markets: “Satz describes and analyses many different 
examples of markets producing inequality through exploiting weak agency and through exploiting the 
vulnerability of the parties involved. (Rössler 2015: 150) vi.  
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She then goes on to apply this general worry to the market in personal data, claiming that the exploitation leads 
to ”detrimental inequalities”. She writes:  
“If we apply these arguments to the market in personal data, we can see that this market can 
easily produce detrimental inequalities: it is precisely one of the goals of online advertisers to 
treat people differently in order to get more “hits” and make more profit”. (Ibid: 151) 
Later in this section, I will explain which forms of exploitation the proponents of this worry seem to think are 
at stake here. The argument from this worry can be reconstructed on a standard form like this: 
The Argument From Exploitation:  
Premise 1:  For- profit markets in personal information are morally permissible only if they 
do not involve exploitation of poor people, which leads to problematic 
inequalities.  
Premise 2:  For- profit markets in personal information do involve exploitation of poor 
people, which leads to problematic inequalities.   
Conclusion:  Therefore, for- profit markets in personal information are morally impermissible. 
(From 1 and 2).  
I think there are good reasons to be skeptical about premise 1. To see this, it is necessary to show that 1) it is 
true that for- profit markets in personal information are morally permissible, while 2) it is false that these 
markets do not involve exploitation of poor people, which leads to problematic inequalities. If premise 1 is 
false, then we already know that the Argument From Exploitation is not sound. Premise 2 is an empirical 
premise. It cannot be settled from the armchairvii. However, in the refutation of premise 1, I try to show that 
markets as such in personal information are not morally impermissible, even if they involve exploitation of 
poor people. Therefore, I will initially assume that markets in personal information do in fact involve 
exploitation, which leads to extensive inequalities. My strategy is then to show that the conditional in premise 
1 is false, even if we, for the sake of argument, grant the negation of the necessary condition in the conditional, 
which is also to grant the truth of premise 2.  
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Now, what could the proponents of the Argument From Exploitation mean by ”exploitation”? Philosophers 
often distinguish between transactional exploitation, and structural exploitation. The difference is this:  
“Exploitation can be transactional or structural. In the former case, the unfairness is a property 
of a discrete transaction between two or more individuals. A sweatshop that pays low wages, 
for example, or a pharmaceutical research firm that tests drugs on poor subjects in the 
developing world, might be said to exploit others in this sense. But exploitation can also 
be structural—a property of institutions or systems in which the “rules of the game” unfairly 
benefit one group of people to the detriment of another.” (Zwolinski & Werheimer 2017) 
In relation to markets in personal information, buying information from poor people might be said to be 
exploitative in the transactional sense, because the buyer takes advantage of their desperate situation, given a 
strong presumption that they are willing to accept a much lower price for their information, than people in non-
desperate circumstances would be. Information markets could also be said to be exploitative in the structural 
sense. Perhaps the information market is structured in a way that only benefits the buyer. The structural 
exploitation is what Jerome seems to be getting at in the quote above. Since nothing of argumentative 
importance hangs on which form of exploitation is present in information markets, I have not specified the 
type of exploitation in the Argument From Exploitation. In the next section, I will argue that there are many 
reasons to be skeptical about premise 1. I will also argue that there are ways to avoid exploitation and inequality 
in markets in personal information, and that if this is true, then we should not prohibit these markets. 
 
Skepticism about premise 1 
I will now try to explain why I think there are reasons to be skeptical about premise 1. First, I will repeat a few 
points from the literature on markets in organs, and the literature on the ethics of sweatshops, which I think 
are applicable to markets in personal information as well.  
Let us begin with a few points from the literature on markets in organsviii. First, if the problem with exploitation 
in for- profit markets in organs is that the seller of the organ does not have enough options available to her, 
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then blocking the option of selling her organ on a market is not making matters better for her. On the contrary, 
blocking the option of selling her organ on a market is prima facie contra productive if the goal is to provide 
the seller with more optionsix.  
Second, if the main concern of a market in organs is exploitation, then banning the market is contra-productive, 
since all evidence shows that there is more scope for exploitation when a market in goods supplied by people 
in desperate circumstances is illegal, than when it is legal (Radcliff et al. 1998: 1951). We have to remember 
that imposing a law does not imply compliance with the law. Another common worry with the alleged 
exploitation is that it will lead to inequality in access to organs. But, if we take status quo to be the relevant 
comparative measure, then this worry seems strange. Why would it be worse if many rich people had more 
access to functioning organs, than if no one did? It seems very harsh to say that if not everyone can have access 
to life-saving organ transplants, then no one should have it. There are no morally relevant differences between 
markets in organs and markets in personal informationx, which can explain why we should allow markets in 
organs, but not in personal information. If anything, there may be a stronger reason in favor of banning markets 
in organs than there is in favor of banning markets in personal information.  
Let me now turn to a few points from the literature on sweatshop ethicsxi. First, if many 
desperately poor people accept jobs at sweatshops, then there is at least a presumption in favor of thinking that 
doing so is the best option available to them. Working in a sweatshop may be horrible, but that does not mean 
that the realistic alternative is any less horrible. It might just mean that offering desperately poor people a job 
at a sweatshop can improve these people’s conditions from very bad, to bad. We must also remember that 
making such offers is more than what most people do. Most of us do nothing, or very little, to improve the 
conditions for desperately poor people. So why think that the owners of sweatshops are doing something 
morally worse than the rest of us, who do little to nothing to help the desperately poor? Again, there seems to 
be no morally relevant differences between the case of sweatshop labor, and the case of markets in personal 
information, which can explain why we should allow sweatshop labor but not markets in information. If 
anything, there might be a stronger presumption in favor of banning sweatshop labor than there is of banning 
markets in personal information.  
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Of course, these prima facie reasons to allow markets in personal information are not decisive 
in any way. They will probably not convince anyone, who was not already convinced of the moral 
permissibility of markets in personal information in the first place. In addition, those who are already 
convinced of the wrongness of markets in organs and sweatshop labor (and I presume that many people are) 
may just have been convinced of the wrongness of markets in personal information by my comparison. 
However, my goal was only to point to the moral similarities between markets in organs, sweatshop labor, and 
markets in personal information. Even if one is not pulled by the reasons I just provided, I think there are 
further reasons to think that markets in personal information are not morally impermissible. The weightiest 
reason is that such markets need not come with any exploitation or inequality.  
I have provided prima facie reasons to allow markets in personal information, even if they 
involve exploitation of poor people, which leads to problematic inequalities. But, there are also reasons to 
think that markets in personal information do not need to come with these alleged problems. If there is a way 
to have a market in personal information that does not come with these problems, then we should at least allow 
that market. The idea is that we can fine-tune, or regulate, market features to counter any objection we might 
have to a given market, including objections from exploitation and inequality (Brennan & Jaworski 2015: 
1058)xii. If we can fine-tune markets to avoid exploitation and inequality, then it is the exploitation and 
inequality that might be morally impermissible, not the market as such in which it occurs. In other words, it is 
not the exchange in itself, of money or goods for personal information that can make the market morally 
impermissible.  
Brennan and Jaworski apply this strategy to a long list of objections, which people have suggested to certain 
markets. They recapitulate the objections like this:  
“A. Wrongful Exploitation: Some markets—for example, in organ sales—might encourage the strong to 
exploit the vulnerable.  
B. Misallocation: Some markets—for example, in Ivy League admissions—might cause those goods to be 
allocated unjustly.  
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C. Rights Violations: Some markets—for example, in slaves—might violate people’s rights.  
D. Paternalism: Some markets—for example, in crystal meth or cigarettes—might cause people to make self-
destructive choices.  
E. Harm to Others: Some markets—for example, in pit bulls or handguns—might lead to greater violence or 
injury to others.  
F. Corruption: Certain markets—for example, in Disney Princesses for one’s daughters—will tend to cause us 
to develop defective preferences or character traits.  
G. Semiotics: Independently of noncommunicative objections, to engage in a market in some good or service 
X is a form of symbolic expression that communicates the wrong motive, or the wrong attitude toward X, or 
expresses an attitude that is incompatible with the intrinsic dignity of X, or would show disrespect or 
irreverence for some practice, custom, belief, or relationship with which X is associated.” (Brennan & Jaworski 
2015: 1053-1055) 
The problems of exploitation and inequality (I take ”misallocation” on the list to mean roughly the same as 
inequality here) are just two of the objections on the list. According to Brennan and Jaworski, the fine-tuning 
strategy works for all of the objections on the list. For the purpose of this paper, however, I do not need such 
a strong claim. I only need to show that the fine-tuning strategy works for exploitation and inequality 
specifically. Setting limits as to how much people may earn in order to participate in the market is a simple 
but, I think, sufficiently clear way to do that. There are at least three ways to set such limit(s). One way is to 
set a lower limit, in order to make sure that people are not too poor when they sell their information. A second 
solution is to set an upper limit, in order to make sure that people are not too rich when they buy information. 
A third solution is to set both a lower- and an upper limit, so that you have to earn less than $X but more than 
$Y to participate in the marketxiii. All three solutions are prima facie efficient ways to avoid both exploitation 
and inequality in the market.  
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It has recently been suggested that Brennan and Jaworski’s fine-tuning strategy does not always work in real-
life markets, since the features that need to be fine-tuned are interdependent (Stout & Carothers 2016). The 
example given by Stout and Carothers is about markets in kidneysxiv:  
“For example, if kidneys are sold at a price determined by supply and demand, then those who 
are willing and able to pay will purchase kidneys, thus eliminating the shortage. One worry that 
an anti-commodification theorist might point to would be that this form of market would only 
give kidneys to those with greater income/wealth. An anticommodification theorist may object 
that the allocation mechanism of this market is unjust. One possible way to solve this issue 
would be to overcome this problem would be to change the means of exchange. A famous 
example of this type of market was the ration cards given by governments during WWII 
(Goodwin et al., 107). Notice that we solved one difficulty caused by one market dial by turning 
another one.” (Ibid: 206) 
The worry pressed by Stout and Carothers is that in some markets, the features of the market are interconnected, 
so that if we fine-tune one feature, we change another. In the example above, Stout and Carothers tried to solve 
the presumed problem of misallocation by changing the means of exchange. But, changing the means of 
exchange in a market is another feature than the feature it is supposed to solve. So, Stout and Carothers say, 
Brannan and Jaworski have not shown that “… there is a policy proposal that could create a market that would 
assuage all the worries of the anti-commodification theorists” (Ibid).  
Suppose that Stout and Carothers are right when they say that real life market features are 
interconnected in a way that Brennan and Jaworski were not aware of. Should Brennan and Jaworski be 
worried about this? Only in relation to markets where fine-tuning market feature P in order to solve problem 
Q causes another problem R, and by solving problem R, it is necessary to fine-tune market feature S, and so 
on either in ad finitum or petitio principii, so that there is no way to avoid all problems in a marketxv. It is 
possible that such markets exist, but Stout and Carothers have not offered an example of such a market, and I 
cannot think of any myself. And, given that we are talking about exploitation and inequality specifically, it 
seems relatively straightforward to apply the fine-tuning strategy to markets in personal information. Stout and 
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Carothers’ critique is of course not the only critique that could be offered to the fine-tuning strategy. But until 
a successful one has been offered, we should grant that the fine-tuning strategy is a good way to counter the 
objection that markets in personal information are morally impermissible because they involve exploitation 
and inequality. In the next section, I will present a prima facie plausible objection to markets in personal 
information, which is not on Brennan and Jaworski’s list, and then I will try to show why this prima facie  
plausible objection is not convincing after all.  
 
The Added-Option Objection 
Let us now consider an objection, which I take to be one of the most promising objections an anti-
commodification theorist can make to a market in personal information. The objection, however, has originally 
been raised to markets in organs, and it is not on Brennan and Jaworski’s list. It is not only relevant for markets 
in organs, though. I will try to apply it to markets in personal information, and then try to show why it is not a 
successful objection. I will call it the Added-Option Objection. This objection has been offered by Simon 
Rippon (Rippon 2014), and it goes something like this: Sometimes it is wrong to add an option for people who 
are in desperate circumstances, even if they would be better off, if they took the option (Rippon 2014: 146). 
This may sound self-refuting, but consider this: If desperately poor people in third world countries were given 
the option to sell their kidney, they might be harmed even though they would be better off making use of the 
option. There are many ways in which added options can be bad for people, according to Rippon. He gives the 
following example:  
“… if I were to dial the emergency number in England having suffered a heart attack, the 
operator would ask me which emergency service is required. If I ask for an ambulance, I would 
not be offered further options of which particular model of vehicle is to be dispatched. If I were 
offered options, perhaps I would be better off taking some such option than I would be with 
whatever would have been provided to me by default” … “For each additional option provided, 
there are clear costs: increased time and other resources will be needed in order for me to choose 
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between my options, and the chances of my decision being optimal may well decrease as more 
options are added.” (Ibid) 
This example shows that sometimes having added options can be bad for you, because these options can make 
it harder to make the best decision under the given circumstances. Other times, not having certain options 
available can be good for you for strategic reasons. For example:  
“… imagine a cashier at a rural filling station that is potentially vulnerable to an overnight 
robbery. It may be better for the cashier to have no key to the safe (and to have a prominent sign 
displaying that information) than for the cashier to have the key which gives him the option to 
open it.” (Ibid: 147) 
However, Rippon is not arguing that the above mentioned ways of making people worse off by adding options 
constitute sufficient reasons for prohibiting markets in organs. Rather, he thinks that in some cases, we harm 
people in poverty by giving them the option to sell their organs, not because taking the option is bad for them, 
but because having the option is (Ibid: 146). The reason is that if we add the option of selling kidneys, for 
instance, the governments in poor countries might say that their citizens cannot get a debt relief, for instance, 
because if they just sold their kidney, they could afford to pay off their debtxvi. When we know that this happens, 
we have a moral obligation not to give these poor people the added option of selling their organs. Or so the 
Added-Option Objection goes.  
Applying the objection to markets in personal information, it is important to note that the 
Added-Option Objection does not press the same point as the Argument From Exploitation does. While the 
Argument From Exploitation holds that it is the exploitation and appertaining inequality in markets in personal 
information that is problematic, the Added-Option Objection holds that it is the added option itself of selling 
information on a market that can be harmful. Note also, that while the Argument From Exploitation talks about 
exploitation, the Added-Option Objection talks about harm (exploitation can of course be harmful in itself)xvii. 
However, one might say that the harm in question can occur only because people in rich countries will be 
tempted to exploit the desperate situation of people in poor countries. If it were not for the exploitative nature 
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of the relation between the rich buyer and the poor seller, the harm would not have been possible in the first 
place. Or so the proponent of the Added-Option Objection might say.  
In the previous section, I offered a range of objections to the Argument From Exploitation. I have now 
presented the Added-Option Objection as an attempt to shift the readers’ sympathies back in favor of a moral 
condemnation of markets in personal information, assuming that the reader was convinced by the fine-tuning 
strategy. In the remainder of this section, I shall try to explain why we should not make that shift in sympathies, 
and thus why we should ultimately not be convinced by the Added-Option Objection.  
I think the objection can be averted through the fine-tuning strategy, in combination with a 
refutation of Rippon’s empirical claim. The empirical claim is this: The introduction of the market in question 
will lead to increased pressure to make use of the added option once it is there. Let me start with the fine-
tuning strategy. We could fine-tune the market in personal information in a way that would escape the Added-
Option Objection. For example, we could say that people may not have any unpaid debt (or whatever negative 
situation we are worried will remain to exist or be amplified, once the market is in place), in order to take part 
in the market. That way, those who would benefit from the added option would still be able to participate, and 
those who would be harmed by the added option would be protected from that harm.  
The skeptic might wonder whether the fine-tuning strategy would lead to people not being equal 
before the law, since only some people would be allowed to participate in certain markets. In a strict sense, the 
fine-tuning strategy implies people not being equal before the law. However, in that strict sense, people are 
not equal before the law in a great number of cases. For example, in many countries you have to be a certain 
age to get a driver’s license, you have to be a certain age to vote, you have to be a certain age to get a discount 
on public transport, you have to be sufficiently poor to be able to receive financial support or food stamps from 
the government etc. If this worry is to be taken seriously, we have to revise a great number of policies. Policies 
which we would probably not be willing to deem morally problematic. If that is true, we should not be so 
worried about the implication that people would not strictly speaking be equal before the law.  
I will now turn to the skepticism about Rippon’s empirical claim. In Rippon’s own words, the claim is this:  
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“If a free market in organs was permitted and became widespread, then it is reasonable to 
assume that your organs would soon enough become economic resources like any other, in the 
context of the market. (Ibid: 147-148) 
This empirical claim seems questionable. Consider this analogy: In countries where prostitution is legal, it is 
normally not expected or demanded that poor citizens try to get a job as a prostitute, before they can get a debt 
relief or receive financial support from the government. Applied to markets in personal information, 
governments would probably not demand that poor citizens go ahead and sell all of their personal information 
on the market, before they can get a debt relief or receive financial support. Rippon’s empirical claim might 
of course turn out to be true, but it is a guess from the armchair, and if anything, there seems to be a presumption 
against it.  
The original Added-Option Objection does not presuppose a default setting of organ markets 
being permissible, since it talks about adding the option of selling organs. Given that such markets are currently 
illegal in most countries, talking about adding the option makes sense. But, maybe some of the objection’s 
appeal is due to the contingent fact that markets in organs are already illegal in most countries. Maybe there is 
something like a status quo bias or an anchoring bias at play here (See Kahneman et al. 1991 and Wilson et al. 
1996). Maybe our moral evaluation of a market is affected by contingent facts about whether that market is 
legal or not at the moment. If we know that a given market is illegal, we might be biased to think that the 
market must also be morally impermissible. Or, maybe our moral evaluation of a market is affected by what 
information about the market we receive first. If we receive the information that some people are harmed by 
the market, maybe we are more prone to deem the market as such morally impermissible, whereas if the first 
information we received was that many people are bettered by the market, we might be more prone to deem it 
permissible, even when it is the exact same market we are talking about in these two cases. At any rate, if the 
market in organs had not been prohibited in the first place, we would not have been talking about adding 
options. Rather, we would probably be talking about how we could avoid the problem of harming certain 
participants in the markets, namely those people who for instance might not be able to receive a debt relief or 
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receive financial support from their governments due to the existence of the market. In that situation, the fine-
tuning strategy should be on the table on the same footing as a complete prohibition of the market.  
Let me now close this section with one final point: Normally, we do not condemn an entire 
market whenever some specific participants are made worse off due to the added option of taking part in the 
market. Consider this: Jones owns an old house in a desolate area. Jones’ house is not worth much, and 
consequently he is allegeable for financial support from the government. Along comes Smith and his rich 
family. They build big expensive mansions around Jones’ house. As a consequence, Jones’ house is now worth 
a bit more than it was before, and now Jones is not allegeable for financial support anymore. As it happens, 
the value of Jones’ house before Smith and his family built their mansions, plus the financial support was 
worth more than Jones’ house is now. So, Smith and his family moving to the area has not been a net benefit 
for Jones. In fact, the option of buying land and building houses has harmed Jones. But that is not a sufficiently 
good reason for deeming markets in land and houses morally impermissiblexviii. If the government should do 
anything at all in this case, it seems clear that they should begin by either compensating Jones or 
regulating/fine-tuning the market, not prohibit the market completely. There seems to be no good reason why 
we should not prefer regulation over prohibition, when it comes to markets in personal information too.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have tried to defend the view that markets in personal information should not be deemed morally 
impermissible, at least not for the reasons given by the proponents of the Argument From Exploitation. I 
presented the Argument From Exploitation on behalf of the anti-commodification theorist, which had as its 
conclusion that markets in personal information are morally impermissible. This argument seems to be 
defended by many people in both the academic literature and in the popular press. I have tried to demonstrate 
that the first premise of the argument it at best very questionable, and that the argument is thus probably 
unsound. I did so by applying a range of relevant points from the literature on markets in organs, and the 
literature on the ethics of sweatshops. I then argued that markets in personal information can be fine-tuned in 
ways that can handle the problem of exploitation, and the inequality which allegedly comes with the 
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exploitation. Then I presented what I take to be one of the most promising objections to markets in organs, 
namely the Added-Option Objection, applied it to markets in personal information, and tried to show why it 
does not succeed either.  
It is important to note that all I have said in this paper is compatible with the view that markets 
in personal information are impermissible. I have only showed that the Argument From Exploitation does not 
succeed in showing why markets in personal information are impermissible. It is still possible, however, that 
there are other, more successful arguments, to be made for the case that those markets are impermissible. Until 
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i See section 2.  
ii See e.g. (Sandel 2013), (Satz 2010), (Brennan & Jaworski 2016), (Radin 1996), (Richards 2012).  
iii If you for example use the personal data manager Datacoup, you will earn approximately $8 a month (Simonite 
2014). For a discussion about how something like a PIM could work if people had legal rights to control use of all 
personal information, see Cheneval 2018.  
iv In the remainder of this article, I will only discuss arguments from the academic literature. For an already famous 
article in the popular press about this worry, see Scott 2018.  
v This is supported by empirical evidence. See See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti et al. 2010.  
vi Rössler does not argue, however, that this is the only worrisome feature of markets in personal information. She 
writes: “The reason why commodifying and commercializing data that were supposed to belong to and stay in the 
sphere of social relations is harmful is because it ultimately hinders and distorts my autonomy and identity…” (Rössler 
2015: 149). My argument in this paper is compatible with accepting an argument from autonomy infringements against 
the permissibility of markets in personal information. I only claim that the following Argument From Exploitation is not 
sound.  
vii Unless premise 2 is read as a conceptual premise. In that case, we would have something to say to it from the 
armchair. I do not, however, think that is what the proponents of the Argument From Exploitation have in mind.  
viii See (Taylor 2005; 2015; 2016; 2017), (Koplin 2014; 2017), (Deonandan, et al. 2012), (Rivera-Lopez 2006), (Veatch 
2003).  
ix See Radcliff-Richards et al. 1998 for a discussion of this point in relation to markets in organs. This point takes for 
granted that the default setting must be that market exchanges between sufficiently informed consenting adults are 
permissible. In the next section, I discuss an objection, which does not make this assumption, namely the Added Option 
Objection.  
x Except that the personal information bought by the rich people can potentially be used to exploit the poor people 
further, in a way that organs cannot. It is still not clear, however, why participating in the market would not still be the 
best option available to the poor.  
xi See e.g. (Zwolinski & Wertheimer 2017), (Powell & Zwolinski 2012).  
xii The market features that can be fine-tuned/regulated can for instance be the participants, the means of exchange, the 
price, the proportion/distribution in the market, the mode of exchange, the mode of payment or the motive of exchange 
(Brennan & Jaworski 2016: 39) 
 
xiii I am not suggesting that we should set such limits. I am only suggesting that if doing so can make a market in 
personal information morally permissible by avoiding exploitation, then the problem is not with the market as such.  
xiv Note that their misallocation worry is an instance of B. on Brennan and Jaworski’s list. 
xv Or, perhaps fine-tuning certain market features in one market, create unacceptable consequences in another market. 
This has been suggested by Luke Semrau.  He gives this example: “But adjustments made to one specific market may 
have dramatic consequences for other markets. Even if it is true that kidneys may be permissibly sold, and babies may 
be permissibly sold, and sex may be permissibly sold, it doesn’t follow that kidneys, babies and sex may be permissibly 
sold under jointly realizable conditions.” (Semrau 2017: 330-331) 
xvi Rippon uses the case of a poor person being unable to pay rent. But, applying the principle of charity, I think his case 
is stronger if the case is about debt reliefs, since presumably you have a stronger moral obligation to pay a debt, than to 
pay for the next month’s rent.  
xvii Earlier I said that the Added-Option Objection is not on Brennan and Jaworski’s list. Although the common 
objections from harm to others are on the list, the harm involved there is not due to the mere option of selling a good on 
a market, but rather to the contingent harmful consequences of doing so.   
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xviii The analogy is not perfect, since if markets in land and houses were morally impermissible, then Jones would be 
doing something morally impermissible too, since he also owns a house. However, the point of the analogy is only to 
illustrate that if some participants in a market are harmed by the existence of the market, then fine-tuning should be 
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